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EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES IN MONTANA
Evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible to prove the
crime for which the defendant is charged.' Such evidence is usually
excluded because it will be given excessive consideration by the jury, not
because it lacks probative value.2 The exclusion of evidence of other
crimes is a result of the court's recognition that a defendant should be
convicted only of the specific crime charged, not because he has com-
mitted other crimes nor because he is possessed of a criminal propensity3
The term "evidence of other crimes" is commonly used specifically
to denote evidence offered during the prosecutor's case-in-chief. 4 Evi-
dence of other crimes may be admissible in Montana, despite the general
rule of exclusion, for the purpose of proving motive, intent, identity, ab-
sence of mistake or inadvertance, or the existence of a common scheme
or plan encompassing the commission of two or more offenses.5
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES IN
MONTANA
A body of case law, originating with State v. Sauter, 6 has caused
considerable confusion as to the admissibility of evidence of other crimes
in Montana. Despite substantial contrary authority, these cases ultimately
resulted in a holding that evidence of other crimes is never admissible. 7
Analysis of the Sauter line of cases however indicates that this holding
was not justified by the precedent relied on by the court. In the Sauter
case, the defendant was charged with rape. Although admitting the act
of intercourse, the defendant alleged that it was committed with consent.
This rape allegedly occurred on a secluded road, after the defendant met
and offered a ride to a woman in a tavern. The prosecution introduced
evidence that the defendant had one month previously, committed rape
,WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, Section 232 (12th ed. 1955); JONEs ON EVIDENCE,
Section 162 (5th 1958).
'See JONES, supra, note 1.
-See State v. Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 114, 232 P.2d 731 (1951) ; State v. Nicks,
134 Mont. 341, 332 P.2d 904 (1958); State v. Ebel, 92 Mont. 413, 423, 15 P.2d
223 (1932) in which the court quotes from State v. Paulson, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N.W.
771, 774 (1903): "From the time when advancing civilization bean to recognize
that the purpose and end of a criminal trial is as much to discharge the innocent
accused as to punish the guilty, it has been held that evidence against him should
be confined to the very offense charged and that neither general bad character,
and commission of other specific disconnected acts, whether criminal merely metric-
ious could be proved against him, this was predicated on the fundamental prin-
ciple of justice that the bad man no more than the good man ought to be con-
victed of a crime not committed by him."
'This paper will examine only evidence offered in this respect. Evidence of other
crimes also enters into consideration as character evidence when it is an issue, to
impeach the credibility of a defendant witness, or to increase the penalty for ha-
bitual criminals.
'State v. Tully, 148 Mont. 166 169, 418 P.2d 549 (1966); State v. Simpson, 109
Mont. 198, 208, 95 P.2d 761, 764 (1939); See Also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554, 560 (1967) as to the Constitutionality of such evidence.
eState v Sauter, 125 Mont. 109 (1951), 232 P.2d 731 (1951).
7State v. Hale, 126 Mont. 326, 249 P.2d 495 (1952).
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on another woman under nearly identical circumstances. The Montana
Supreme court vacated the conviction, holding that the prior act had no
logical connection with the crime charged. In the words of the court:
"Sexual acts, whether rape or no rape, originating in barroom
pickups, powered by the urge and consumated in automobiles, are
entirely too common in this day and age to have much evidentiary
value in showing a scheme or plan."'
Despite striking similarity, the evidence was thus excluded because the
court held that there was no logical connection between the fact proposed
to be proved and the fact in issue.
In State v. Searle,9 decided shortly after the Sauter decision, the
charge was sodomy allegedly committed on a boy hired by the defendant
to work in his place of business. The prosecution called other boys who
had been employed by the defendant in an attempt to elicit evidencc
of other like offenses. This evidence was held incompetent and therefore
inadmissible under the Sauter precedent. However, unlike the Sauter case,
admissibility was not determined on the basis of the logical connection
between the evidence and the act charged. As a result, the decision in
State v. Hale'0 was inevitable. In that case, a county surveyor was con-
victed of obtaining money under false pretenses. The prosecution intro-
duced evidence that on another occasion, the defendant obtained money
in the same manner as the act charged thereby indicating a scheme or
plan. Citing the Searle precedent, the court held, without a determination
of logical relevancy, that evidence of other crimes is never admissible.
The Hale case thus does not stand on stable foundations and at the very
most could only have been considered dubious authority.
Subsequent Montana decisions have affirmed this conclusion. In State
v. Merritt," the court noted that generally evidence of other crimes is
not admissible. However, it was conceded that there existed exceptions
and that evidence of other crimes was admissible in Montana to prove
intent, motive, or the existence of a common scheme or plan. In the Mer-
ritt case, the Sauter, Searle and Hale cases were noted as following the
general rule of exclusion not as authority for the complete exclusion of
evidence of other crimes. In State v. Tiedemann, 12 the court did not allow
the admission of evidence of other crimes, but also spoke of exceptions to
the general rule and stated that their number and scope should not be
increased. In State v. Tully,13 the Montana court quoted the gen-
eral rule of exclusion and the five exceptions which are traditional in
Montana law. In that case the court specifically affirmed the admissibility
'State v. Sauter, supra, note 6 at 112.
'125 Mont. 467, 239 P.2d 995 (1952).
1 Supra, note 7.
'State v. Merritt, 138 Mont. 546, 357 P.2d 683 (1960).
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of evidence of other crimes to prove intent. Finally, in State v. Jensen, 4
the court specifically overruled authority that evidence of other crimes
is always inadmissible. Thus it would seem clear that evidence of
other crimes is not only admissible in Montana, but is admissible to
the extent of the traditional five exceptions to the general rule of
exclusion.
. would be erroneous to assume that the Sauter and Searle cases have
act contiibuted some lasting effect. The policy of those cases continues to
be manifested in that a similarity may be required to exist between the
collateral act and the crime charged. Similarity between crimes is required
in Montana when the evidence is offered to prove motive, intent, or the
existence of a common scheme or plan. 15 Since no eases have yet been
decided which involve either the identity or the mistake or inadvertance
exceptions, it cannot be said that evidence offered under these exceptions
is also subjct to the requirement of similarity. As a practical matter, sim-
ilarity is a factor considered when determining the logical relevancy of
evidence of other crimes. For this reason, the degree of required sim-
ilarity is olso unclear. Evidence of the same crime committed on a
dl iferent person, at a different place and for a different motive has been
held inadmissible even though it would have been highly relevant to a
material issue.' 6 Evidence which was totally irrelevant and designed
solely to prejudice the defendant has also been excluded.1 7 Between these
two extremes lies a gray area in which the combination of the degree of
prejudice and the degree of logical relevancy may vary widely.
Montanta has a large body of case law concerning evidence of other
crimes. It is the thesis of this paper that in determining the admissibility
of such evidence, these cases must be viewed in their entirety. So viewed,
they represent an unbroken development to the present day. Consequently,
evidence of other crimes has been here treated in accordance with the
foregoing thesis.
THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES
The prosecution, as a general rule, may not offer to prove specific
criminal acts other than the crime charged in the indictment. But what is
evidence of other crimes? It is evidence of collateral criminal conduct
which, because of some logical connection, is offered as proof of the crime
charged. Evidence of specific acts of misconduct, which are niot in them-
selves crimes, is not by definition within the rules governing evidence of
other crimes. Logically then, such evidence should not be excluded if it
"State v. Jensen, 26 St. Rep. 348 (1969).
'State v. Merritt, sapra, note 11 at 550 clarified this requirement.
'State v. Crowl, 135 Mont. 98, 337 P.2d 367 (1959). But see State v. Jensen, supra,
note 14, in which similar acts, thought not proved as the same statutory crime, were
held admissible.
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meets general evidentiary requirements of competency, relevancy, and ma-
teriality. However, such evidence has the same prejudicial effect as evi-
dence which establishes commission of other criminal offenses. Such evi-
dence should thus be subjected to the same general rule of exclusion, and
should be admissible only for the purposes which justify admission of
evidence of other crimes.18
Evidence of other crimes discloses the defendant's commission of
a collateral criminal act. Evidence disclosing a prior conviction is the
strongest proof which can be offered in this respect. However, evidence
of other crimes is introduced to prove the offense for which the defendant
is charged, not the other crime which is thereby disclosed. For this reason
it is not necessary to prove commission of the other crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 19 It is improper however, to offer mere accusation or
innuendo as evidence under any of the exceptions to the general rule." '
A prime facie case of the defendant's collateral guilt must be established
before evidence of other crimes is admissible under any of the exceptions
to the general rule.2"
In itself, evidence of other crimes is not usually sufficient to con-
vict. As circumstantial evidence, it can raise only an inference of the
defendant's guilt of the crime charged. Such evidence must usually be
accompanied by corroborating evidence. However, if the inference which
is raised by the evidence is so strong, that it admits of no other reasonable
hypothesis than the defendant's guilt, it is sufficient to sustain a con-
viction. 22
COMMON SCHEME OR PLAN
Evidence of other crimes which tends to establish the existence of a
common scheme or plan, encompassing the commission of two or more
offenses may be admissible in Montana. 23 Evidence of a common scheme or
plan will be found in two distinguishable fact situations: (1) When the
proffered evidence tends to prove a crime which is part of the res gestae
of the offense charged, (2) When two or more acts are committed pur-
suant to a scheme or plan which evidences a common purpose.
An act is part of the res gestae when it is contemporaneous with or
part of the charge, and when the circumstances surrounding the collateral
crime are essential to prove or explain the act charged. For example,
evidence was allowed to show that the defendant committed the crime
of hiding stolen property which was not charged in the indictment. The
admissibility of that evidence was held proper in a prosecution for the
"State v. Tiedeman, supra, note 12; See JONES, stipra, note 1, Section 162.
"'State v. Ebel, 92 Mont. 413, 424, 15 P.2d 233 (1932).
O'WHARTON'S CRImINAL EVIDENCE, supra, note 1.
"State v. Ebel, supra, note 18.
"See State v. Ebel, supra, note 18 at 421.
"State v. Merritt, supra, note 11; State v. Tully, supra, note 5.
[Vol. 30
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theft of the property.2 4 In another case, the defendant was charged only
with passing a forged state warrant. Evidence that the defendant had
also committed the crime of presenting a false claim to the state was
held admissible.
25
Evidence of a scheme or plan, which discloses a common purpose is
subject to rather strict rules when it also discloses commission of other
crimes. Such evidence is admissible in Montana only if the other crime
is: (1) similar to the act charged, (2) closely connected, and (3) com-
mittod on or about the same time as the act charged. 26
The degree of required similarity has varied in Montana. Older cases
held that exact similarity was not necessary and required only a more
or less common purpose with relation to the act charged.27 Recent deci-
sions however have imposed very strict requirements of similarity. Not
only must the other crime be similar, but the circumstances surrounding
its commission must be nearly identical. For example, evidence which dis-
closed that the defendant had previously obtained money on a chattel
mortgage through fraud, was held inadmissible in a trial for forgery of
another chattel mortgage. The court determined that the obligor on the
first chattel mortgage had actually signed it, while the obligor on the
mortgage charged in the indictment did not sign it. The two transactions
were held by the court to have differed in important particulars .2  The
fact of similarity must also be apparent from the facts alone. To permit
a witness to testify that two criminal transactions are similar consitutes
reversible error in Montana. 29
The requirement of close connection between the acts refers to the
accused's state of mind. A scheme or plan to commit criminal acts must
actually exist in the defendant's contemplation.30 The fact that two or
more offenses have been committed the same way does not in itself show
the existence of a common scheme or plan.3 1 Evidence of other crimes
has been held admissible to prove a common scheme or plan when it dis-
closed operation of a soft drink parlor to sell illegal liquor;3 2 the arrest
confiscation of liquor and repeated failure to prosecute moonshiners; 3 3
or repeated use of a private wineroom to rob. 34
"State v. Rindall, 146 Mont. 64, 404 P.2d 327 (1965).
'State v. Phillips, 127 Mont. 381, 264 P.2d 1009 (1953).
GState v. Merritt, supra, note 11 at 549.
27See State v. Lund, 93 Mont. 169, 18 P.2d 603 (1932).
21sState v. Merritt, supra, note 11.
-State v. Merritt, supra, note 11; State v. Cassill, 71 Mont. 274, 229 Pac. 716 (1934).
"See State v. Sauter, supra, note 3. See also State v. Jensen, supra, note 14, in which
the chiropractor defendant's 'continuous pattern of behavior" in molesting female
patients was admissible as evidence of a common scheme or plan.
"State v. Sauter, supra, note 3.
"2State v. Cesar, 72 Mont. 252, 232 Pac. 1109 (1925).
3State v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 219 Pac. 1106 (1923).
"State v. McCarthy 36 Mont. 226, 92 Pac. 521 (1907); For other examples of a
scheme or plan see State v. Groom, 89 Mont. 447, 300 Pac. 226 (1931) ; State v.
Newman, 34 Mont. 434, 87 Pac. 462 (1906); State v. Mitton, 37 Mont. 366, 96 Pac.
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Other crimes must have been committed "on or about the same time"
to evidence the existence of a common scheme or plan. This time require-
ment has been variously construed by the Montana court. It is clear that
evidence of other crimes committed on the same occasion is admissible
to show a scheme.3 5 It is also clear that evidence of subsequent acts of-
fered for the same purpose, is not always admissible to ultimately prove
a state of mind.3 6 Evidence of prior acts should also be limited at some
point in time. The opinions indicate that each case will be decided on
its own facts.3 7  However at some point in time, evidence of other
crimes, which establishes a common scheme, is no more than proof that
the defendant is possessed with a continuing criminal propensity. In
Montana, evidence which is designed to show only a criminal propensity
is never admissible.38
MOTIVE
Motive is that state of the criminal mind which leads or tempts the
mind to indulge in criminal acts; it is the moving power which impels
the defendant to act for a definite result.39 Motive is not an essential
element of any crime, but evidence of other crimes may be admissible to
prove a motive in Montana. Establishment of a motive may be highly
relevant in determining the guilt of the crime charged. For example, evi-
dence of other crimes has been held clearly relevant to prove that the de-
fendant committed a subsequent crime to avoid prosecution. In a classical
case, 40 the defendant admitted killing a deputy sheriff, but pleaded self
defense. The Montana court affirmed the admission of evidence of two
prior murders to establish a motive for killing with malice. In an analogous
case, 41 it was established that the collateral crime need not be similar to
the act charged to logically prove a motive. Evidence of statutory rape
and criminal abortion was held admissible in that case to infer the de-
fendant's motive for committing murder. The court held that the evidence
inferred that the defendant killed a young girl, not in self defense, but
to remove her as a source of criminal liability. Although no Montana case
has since been decided under the motive exception, a more recent case
has announced that evidence of other crimes, offered to prove a motive,
is subject to a requirement of similarity between the crimes.42
-State v. Pippi, 59 Mont. 116, 195 Pac. 556 (1921).
"State v. Knox, 119 Mont. 449, 175 P.2d 774 (1946) which overruled as far as in-
consistent State v. Siinanton, 100 Mont. 292, 49 P.2d 981 (1935). See State v. Jen-
sen, supra, note 14, where acts committed two years subsequent to the acts charged
in the indictment were admitted.
"See State v. Searle, supra, note 9-30 days too long; State v. Tully, supra, note 5-
11 months held not too long. See State v. Nicks, supra, note 3.
"State v. Tiedeinann, supra, note 12.
n"WHARTON, supra, note 1, Section 85.
"State v. Simpson, 109 Mont. 198, 95 P.2d 761 (1939).
'State v. Htallowell, 79 Mont. 343, 256 Pac. 380 (1927).
"'State v. Merritt, supra, note 11 at 550.
[Vol. 30
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ABSENCE OF MISTAKE OR INADVERTANCE (HEREIN GUILTY
KNOWLEDGE)
Evidence of other crimes may be admissible when it tends to prove
lack of mistake or guilty knowledge. Such evidence is necessarily ad-
missible only when relevant to the defendant's state of mind. Evidence
admissible under this exception is especially relevant and important when
the defendant's guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime,
i.e. receiving stolen property. The relevancy of evidence offered in this
respect is normally tested by comparing the degree of similarity between
the collateral act and the act for which the defendant is charged. In a
Montana case, 43 the defendant was charged with receiving stolen livestock.
Evidence that the defendant had on prior occasions received stolen live-
stock from the same thief, was received to show the defendant's guilty
knowledge upon receipt of the animal charged in the indictment. Other
Montana cases in this area suggest the usual limitations. Evidence of
similar crimes will be admissible to show the lack of mistake or guilty
knowledge if committed at a time not too remote, 44 if the same methods
of commission are employed,4" or if the acts are logically connected by a
common scheme or plan.
46
IDENTITY
The identity of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is an essential
element which must be established in every criminal case. Evidence of
other crimes may be admissible, in exception to the general rule, to prove
identity. The relevancy of such evidence commonly depends on the degree
of similarity between the act charged and the collateral crime. For ex-
ample, establishment of a highly characteristic method of committing crimes
can be relevant in proving the wrongdoers identity as perpetrator of a
crime committed in the same manner.47 Such evidence will usually be most
appropriately offered under the scheme or plan exception. In such a case,
particular care must be taken to sufficiently identify the defendant with
the collateral crime.48 In Montana, sufficient identification is manifested
only upon establishment of the defendant's prima facie guilt of the col-
lIateral crime.49
Evidence of other crimes may also logically infer identity when the
other crime is not similar to the act charged. Such inferences could log-
ically be raised whenever the evidence establishes the existence of a mo-
tive.50
"State v. Groom, supra, note 33.
4"State v. Tully, supra, note 5; State v. Moxley, 41 Mont. 402, 110 Pac. 83 (1910).
'State v. Tully, supra, note 5.
4"State v. Groom, supra, note 33.
47See People v. Pette. 28 Cal.2d 306, 169 P.2d 924 (1946) Cert. denied 329 U.S. 790
(1946). Noted in 7 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 463 475 (1960).
"State v. Ebel, supra, note 18; State v. Russell, 93 Mont. 334, 18 P.2d 611 (1933).
4"State v. Ebel, supra, note 18.
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INTENT
A conviction for a criminal act is justified only if the prosecution
proves that the act was committed pursuant to a criminal state of mind.
Evidence which infers such a criminal state of mind may logically arise
from the commission of other crimes. Such evidence may be admissible in
exception to the general rule of exclusion in Montana. Evidence of other
crimes may tend to directly infer the criminal state of mind. An illustra-
tive case involved a prosecution for uttering a fraudulent check.51 The
prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence that the defendant had
also written other fraudulent checks under nearly identical circumstances.
This evidence logically and directly inferred the defendant's intention to
defraud. Evidence allowed under other exceptions however, may only infer
a fact which in turn infers a criminal state of mind. For example, evi-
dence of other crimes which establishes a compelling motive has been
held relevant to infer malice. 52
Evidence of other crimes may logically infer a state of mind in several
different ways. One such inference is raised by proof that the defendant
committed another similar and closely related crime. Such evidence will
logically indicate that both acts were committed with the same criminal
state of mind. This inference most commonly arises when evidence is of-
fered under the common scheme of plan exception. '3
Auother logical inference arises from the repetitive nature of the
act charged. The mechanics of this inference have been explained as a
logical process of the mind which recognizes the possibility of an unusual
or abnormal element occurring in one instance. But the more often a
similar transaction occurs with similar results, the less likely is the ab-
normal element to be the actual cause of the acts.5 4 This inference is
particularly appropriate when the defendant pleads mistake or inad-
vertance. Proof of repetition of similar acts tends to logically reduce
the probability that an abnormal cause such as mistake or inadvertance
is the actual cause of the act.
Attempts to prove a criminal state of mind with evidence of other
crimes may often amount to no more than a prejudicial proof of criminal
propensity. In Montana, evidence of other crimes which offered to prove
a criminal state of mind, is said to be subject to strict requirements of
similarity and close time relation. However, evidence which is offered
under the motive exception to ultimately prove a state of mind, is not
logically subject to the requirements of close time relation. Commission of
the second crime depends on the contingency of arrest and prosecution
to supply the motive. It is obvious that the state will not in all cases
discover the prior crime within a time closely related to the second of-
fense.
51State v. Tully, supra, note 5.
"'State v. Simpson, supra, note 40; State v. Hallowell, supra, note 41.
'See State v. Phillips, supra, note 24.
5 State v. Hughes, 76 Mont. 421, 427, 246 Pac. 959 (1926).
[Vol. 30
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Evidence of other crimes may be excluded even when it would seem
clearly admissible under an exception to the general rule of exclusion.
The reason for such exclusion is the existence of policy considerations
which recognize the prejudicial nature of such evidence. 55 Evidence of
other sex offenses may be especially relevant in a prosecution for a like
offense. However, the operation of policy considerations has usually re-
sulted in the exclusion of evidence of other sex offenses in Montana.5"
However, a very recent case 57 seems to have completely disregarded
these considerations. In that case, a chiropractor defendant was charged
with a lewd act on a female patient who was under the age of sixteen
years. Prior to proving the corpus delecti, the state was allowed to
examine twelve witnesses who testified as to similar crimes committed
upon them by the defendant.
In one factual situation, a large body of Montana case law indicates
the court's willingness to consider evidence of prior sex crimes.58 Those
cases have all involved evidence which discloses commission of other sex
offenses upon the prosecuting witness. Such evidence is allowed to cor-
roborate the testimony of the prosecuting witness by establishing the inti-
mate relationship. 59 In most cases, such evidence is highly relevant. But
in many cases, the testimony of the prosecuting witness may be the sole
basis for conviction. Allowance of such evidence, in default of any inde-
pendent evidence, can be made to assume a weight far beyond its natural
credibility.60 Due to the emotional nature of sex crimes, when the state
relies only upon the testimony of the prosecuting witness, the jury should
be cautious of convicting upon such evidence."1
MATERIALITY AND RELEVANCY
Evidence of other crimes which may be justified under any of the
exceptions to the general rule, is not automatically admitted into evi-
dence. Admissible evidence must be both relevant and competent. Relevant
evidence can be defined in the following manner:
5See generally WHARTON, supra, note 1. Policy considerations exist when the jury
will give excessive weight to the evidence, when the defendant would not be given
notice by the indictment and would thus be surprised in making his defense or when
the jury would be confused by the evidence as it relates to the crime charged.
'State v. Sauter, supra, note 3; State v. Searle, supra, note 9; State v. Tiedevnann,
supra, note 12.
5State v. Jensen, supra, note 14; but see generally WHARTON, supra, note 1; JONES,
supra, note 1, Section 169; 41 Iowa L. Rev., 325, 333 (1956).
:;State v. Tiedeinann, supra, note 12; State v. Peterson, 102 Mont. 495, 59 P.2d 61
(1936) ; State v. Paddock, 86 Mont. 569, 284 Pac. 549 (1930); State v. Harris, 51
Mont. 496, 154 Pac. 198 (1915); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080
(1916); State v. Gainmos, 53 Mont. 118, 162 Pac. 596 (1916).
59State v. Tiedemann, supra, note 12 at 241.
'See State v. Peterson, supra, note 58.
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Evidence is relevant when it is persuasive or indicative that
a fact in controversy did or did not exist because the conclusion in
question may be logically inferred from the evidence. 2 (Emphasis
supplied)
To justify a conviction the defendant must be proved to have corn-
mitted a criminal act pursuant to a criminal state of mind. Evidence of
other crimes may supply that proof, but the probable guilt of the defendant
must be supported by an inference which is logical.6 3 The probability of
an inferred fact is normally measured in terms of common experience
and varies inversely with the number of intervening inferences. For
example, in a case in which the defendants were charged with assault,
evidence of an assault committed twenty hours previously was held ir-
relevant to prove intent. 64 The facts indicate that the first assault was
committed on a city street with an intent to rob, while the assault for
which the defendants were charged, was committed in a hobo jungle for
depraved reasons. Thus there was no logical connection between the two
acts.
Evidence is also not relevant in the particular case, unless the log-
ically inferred fact is in issue before the court. As a result, an especially
difficult problem arises when the defendant admits either commission of
the act or the criminal state of mind. Evidence of other crimes must be
carefully scrutinized to determine whether it is actually relevant to an
issue before the court."5 For example, evidence of other crimes may be
admissible to prove the identity of the defendant as perpetrator of the
crime. But in many cases, the defendant will admit commission of the
act. Admission of the fact does not preclude the state from offering
proof of the same fact when it is necessary to the proof of the defendant's
guilt.66 Moreover, such evidence may also be admissible under other ex-
ceptions which logically infer a criminal state of mind. However, evi-
dence which logically infers identity, does not in all cases logically infer
intent. When a defendant admits a fact, evidence of other crimes which
tends to prove the same fact is admissible only when such evidence also
logically infers another fact actually in issue.6 7 For example, in a rape
case, 6s the defendant conceded the act of intercourse, but maintained
that it was committed with consent. The prosecution introduced evidence
of other crimes which arguably inferred identity and a criminal state
of mind. When the Supreme Court determined that the evidence did not
logically infer intent, it ruled that it should have been excluded from
the trial completely. In a fraudulent check case, 69 the defendant ad-
OWHARTON, supra, note 1, Section 148.
"Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Sections 60-64 (1957).
"'State v. Crowl, 135 Mont. 98, 102, 337 P.2d 367 (1959).
"WHARTON, supra, note 57.
"See State v. Hallowell, supra, note 41; State v. Tully, supra, note 5; 19 A.L.R. 1428.
1I7d.; See also WHARTON, supra, note 1, Section 235 at 513.
"State v. Sauter, supra, note 3.
"State v. Tully, supra, note 5.
[Vol. 30
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 30 [1968], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol30/iss2/9
NOTES
mitted writing the check but pleaded no intention to defraud. The prose-
cution introduced evidence that the defendant had written several other
checks under nearly identical circumstances. This evidence was held prop-
erly admissible because in addition to logically inferring identity of the
writer, it also logically inferred the criminal state of mind. Thus evidence
which logically infers a fact in issue, cannot be barred by the defendant's
admission of another fact which is also logically inferrable from that
evidence.
CONCLUSION
The Montana courts have maintained a strong concern for the rights
of the defendant when determining the admissibility of evidence of other
crimes. The exceptions to the general rule of exclusion of such evidence
are not mutually exclusive and evidence can be admissible under more
than one exception. For this reason, it is often difficult to determine the
exception or exceptions which have justified admission of evidence of
other crimes. Analysis suggests that several criteria may be used to de-
termine admissibility. First, the courts may require that evidence meet
standards particular to each exception.7 0  Secondly, the courts will ex-
anine the evidence to see if it meets the general evidentiary requirements
of competency, materiality and relevancy. 7' Thirdly, the courts will de-
termine whether there exists a substantial policy reason which requires
the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence.72 Since evidence of other
crimes is admissible only as an exception to the general rule of exclusion,
more than mere lip service has been given to the general rule to prevent
prejudice. In view of this laudable recognition of the defendant's rights,
it is clear that evidence of other crimes admissible only under the five
exceptions to the general rule and when it will not prejudice the de-
fendant to an extent violative of traditional justice and fair play in the
courtroom.
WM. P. ROSCOE, III
"The strict criteria under the scheme or plan or exception are the best example.
,'See State v. Knox, supra, at note 35.
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